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Abstract
In two studies, a possible mediation effect was tested of cognitive interpretation bias in the relation between respectively
dispositional mindfulness and acceptance, on the one hand, and symptoms of depression and anxiety, on the other hand. An
undergraduate student sample (N = 133; 86% female,Mage = 19.8) and a convenience community sample (N = 186; 66% female,
Mage = 36.5) were examined by means of an online questionnaire measuring dispositional mindfulness (FFMQ-SF; Study 1) and
acceptance (AAQ-II; Study 2), anxiety (STAI-trait) and depressive (BDI-II) symptoms, and interpretation bias (with the inter-
pretation bias task, IBT). Considering both studies, results showed consistently the expected relations of larger mindfulness skills
going together with a smaller cognitive interpretation bias and lower levels of depression and anxiety symptoms. More interest-
ingly, it was found that interpretation bias served as a mediator in the relations between respectively dispositional mindfulness
and acceptance, and symptoms of depression and anxiety. With these findings, some more insight in the working mechanisms of
mindfulness-based treatments on internalizing psychopathology has been obtained.
Keywords Dispositional mindfulness . Acceptance . Interpretation bias . Information processing . Anxiety symptoms .
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Introduction
The mental health field is confronted with rapid scientific
support for the new third generation of behavior and cognitive
therapies, such as mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR;
Kabat-Zinn 1990), mindfulness-based cognitive therapy
(MBCT; Segal et al. 2001), and acceptance and commitment
therapy (ACT; Hayes et al. 1999). Rather than targeting and
attempting to alter the content and frequency of cognitions and
emotions, as in traditional cognitive therapy models, these
mindfulness-based therapies target on altering the relationship
with cognitions and emotions. In these therapies, focus is on
decentering, which refer to the capacity to shift from one’s
subjective experience onto observing that experience, which
is put forward as important process for mental health
(Bernstein et al. 2015). These therapies appear to be effective
for a variety of psychopathology such as chronic pain (Hilton
et al. 2016), substance misuse (Li et al. 2017), and depression
and anxiety problems (Hofmann et al. 2010).
Traditional cognitive models of psychopathology empha-
size the key role of information processing biases in the de-
velopment and maintenance of various psychological disor-
ders such as anxiety disorders and depression (Beck et al.
1985; Beck and Haigh 2014). In this view, a function of the
mechanisms underlying fear is to facilitate detection of danger
in the environment and to help the organism respond effec-
tively to threatening situations (see Bar-Haim et al. 2007).
This leads to attentional biases, characterized by the finding
that attention is drawn to the location of threat stimuli more
quickly and easily than to other stimuli (e.g., Fox et al. 2001).
In addition, interpretation biases are involved (Beck et al.
1985), which refer to the recurrent interpretation of ambiguous
information in a threatening or negative way. Research has
indeed demonstrated the significance of biased attention and
interpretation in the development and maintenance of psycho-
pathology such as anxiety disorders and depression (e.g.,
Blackwell and Holmes 2010; De Raedt and Koster 2010).
Congruently, reduction in attention and interpretation biases
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is found to decrease psychopathological symptoms (e.g.,
Mackintosh et al. 2006; Mathews and Mackintosh 2000).
Among other possible mechanisms of change,
mindfulness-based therapies are highly associated with re-
duced information processing biases (see Hanley et al.
2015). That is, mindfulness is theorized to be linkedwith more
veridical appraisals of experiences and a reduced tendency to
evaluate the present moment by previously held expectations
and beliefs (Hanley et al. 2015). Mindfulness practice is asso-
ciated with a Bbeginner’s mind,^ which refers to the ability to
observe each experience as something new, without any atten-
tion or interpretation bias (Bishop et al. 2004). Likewise, un-
biased processing within mindfulness is referred to as
accepting and experiencing each moment as it is, not filtered
through one’s cognitive apparatus (Lakey et al. 2008). In a
similar vein, Brown and Ryan (2004) argued that mindfulness
is paying attention carefully to what is actually happening in
each moment without trying to alter or change (cf. accep-
tance), or put a conceptual framework around it. As a final
illustration of this idea of unbiased processing, Vago (2014)
stated that mindfulness-based practices may operate by replac-
ing the learned maladaptive representations by novel more
accurate observations and decreased bias. In other words, it
is assumed that through mindfulness practice, one is able to
perceive a larger proportion of reality more accurately and that
biases related to one’s limited world- and self-view are
decreased.
Despite these theoretical implications, so far, relatively lit-
tle empirical work has focused on the relation between mind-
fulness practice and basic cognitive processes, which may
provide more insight into the mechanisms by which
mindfulness-based therapies improve mental health. Some
studies, however, indeed found support for the supposed role
of mindfulness in reducing cognitive biases. In this context,
most studies focused on attentional bias. For example, studies
have shown that mindfulness is related to less attentional bias
in recovering alcohol dependent patients (Garland et al. 2012)
and in formerly depressed adults (De Raedt et al. 2012).
Furthermore, in a treatment study, Garland and Howard
(2013) provided a first tentative indication that a mindfulness-
oriented intervention may reduce attentional bias for pain-
related stimuli in chronic pain patients. These studies give a
first indication that mindfulness and specific (attentional) infor-
mation processing are indeed related.
In the information processing domain of negativity bias,
the relation of mindfulness was experimentally studied by
Kiken and Shook (2011). Most notably, they found that par-
ticipants who received a mindfulness induction displayed no
bias toward negativity and a more accurate observation of
positivity. In a cross-sectional study in social phobic partici-
pants, Schmertz et al. (2012) found that cognitive appraisals in
social situations acted as a mediator in the relation between
mindfulness and social anxiety symptoms. In other words,
mindfulness related negatively to symptoms of psychopathol-
ogy (i.e., social anxiety symptoms) via its impact on cognitive
(biased) appraisals.
Although mindfulness is usually seen as a state (or mode;
Bishop et al. 2004), one could identify people who are more
experienced or skilled to practice states of mindfulness than
others (Brown et al. 2007). These people could be defined as
possessing a higher mindfulness disposition (cf. trait) or ev-
eryday mindfulness (Thompson and Waltz 2007). This dispo-
sitional mindfulness is also shown to be significantly related
to mental health and well-being. For example, Shorey et al.
(2014) found in substance use patients that lower trait mind-
fulness was associated with more severe levels of substance
use, depression, and PTSD. Pepping et al. (2016) found in
adolescents lower dispositional mindfulness to be related to
higher levels of depression, anxiety, and stress. These results
fit nicely with the much cited work of Brown and Ryan
(2003), in which significant relations are reported between
dispositional mindfulness and a wide range of psycho(patho)-
logical factors, like levels of depressive symptoms, anxiety
symptoms, negative affectivity, neuroticism, and, on the pos-
itive site, levels of subjective vitality, self-esteem,
competence, and life satisfaction.
The above described information processing studies of
Kiken and Shook (2011) and Schmertz et al. (2012) seem to
suggest that mindfulness is associated with less negative cog-
nitive biases in the domain of interpretation. In two current
studies, we aimed to examine this association more explicitly,
together with their relations with anxiety and depressive
symptomatology. More specifically, it was examined whether
interpretation bias would act as a mediator in the negative
relation between mindfulness, on the one hand, and levels of
anxiety and depression, on the other hand, as this would shed
some more light on possible mechanisms of change of the
mindfulness-based treatments for anxiety and depressive dis-
order. In a first study, we investigated these hypothesized re-
lations by measuring participants’ level of dispositional mind-
fulness as indication of their general tendency to practice
states of mindfulness (cf. Brown et al. 2007). In a second
study, our aim was to investigate the generalizability of the
hypothesized mediation model by broadening the scope to an
important element of mindfulness, namely acceptance.
Acceptance and mindfulness are inextricably linked concepts,
with acceptance of internal experiences being a key-
component of mindfulness-based therapies. Likewise, mind-
fulness is integrated in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
(Hayes et al. 1999, 2012). Both dispositional mindfulness and
acceptance can therefore be considered as eminent parts of
mindfulness-based practice. Although acceptance is part of
most mindfulness definitions (cf. Fletcher and Hayes 2005)
and is described as a mechanism ofmindfulness (e.g., Gu et al.
2015), acceptance and mindfulness are regarded as separate
constructs. Acceptance, or its reverse experiential avoidance,
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has shown to have incremental validity over mindfulness
alone in predicting depression and anxiety (Fledderus et al.
2012). Therefore, in a second study, after investigating dispo-
sitional mindfulness as predictor, it was examined whether
acceptance as well was related to cognitive interpretation bias,
and whether interpretation bias would act as a mediator in the
relation between acceptance and levels of anxiety and depres-
sion. For both studies, we hypothesized that higher disposi-
tional mindfulness and acceptance relates to a smaller cogni-
tive interpretation bias, and that this interpretation bias serves
as a mediator in the assumed negative relation between these
mindfulness skills and symptoms of depression and anxiety.
Study 1
Method
Participants
Participants (N = 133) were 115 female (86.5%) and 18
male (13.5%) undergraduate students with a mean age of
19.79 years (SD = 2.80, range 17–41). By far the largest
part had a traditional Dutch background (79.7%), with
some participants having other origins, like Turkish
(5.3%), Moroccan (2.3%), Antillean (2.3%), Surinam
(1.5%), or other (8.9%). The majority (54.1%) did not
have any meditation experience, whereas 35.3% had a bit
and 10.6% had (quite) some experience with meditation
practices.
Procedure
Data were collected through a web-based survey using the
online survey software Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT,
USA n.d.). Participants were invited to take part in the study
using the online university research platform. Interested
persons could sign in and consequently received an e-mail
with a short introduction and a link to the online question-
naire. Participants were instructed to fill out the question-
naires in one consecutive session without significant senso-
ry disturbances. The questionnaire started with explanation
of ethical rules (like anonymous data collection and com-
plete voluntary participation), followed by respectively the
IBT, FFMQ-SF, STAI, BDI, and some general questions on
demographics factors and meditation experience. In addi-
tion, the 20-item PANAS was measured as part of another
research project. Subjects received course credits for
participation.
Measures
Dispositional mindfulness was measured with the Dutch short
version of the Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire
(FFMQ-SF; Bohlmeijer et al. 2011). This questionnaire con-
tains 24 items in five subscales (i.e., Observe, Describe, Act
with awareness, Nonjudge, Nonreact). Likert response scales
range from 1 = (almost) never true to 5 = very often or always
true. Higher total scores indicate higher dispositional mind-
fulness. Psychometric properties of this scale are good
(Bohlmeijer et al. 2011).
Symptoms of depression were measured with the Dutch
version of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck
et al. 1996; Van der Does 2002). This 21-item questionnaire
consists of four statements per item with increasing symptom
severity which are scored from 0 to 3, resulting in a total score
of 0–63 with higher scores indicating more depressive symp-
tom severity. The BDI-II has been widely used for research as
well as clinical purposes and its psychometric properties have
been well established (Van der Does 2002).
Trait anxiety was measured by using the Dutch trait version
of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al.
1983; Van der Van der Ploeg et al. 1980). This commonly used
scale contains 20 items with response categories ranging from
1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always), summing up to higher
levels of trait anxiety in cases of higher total scores.
Psychometric properties of this scale are good (Spielberger
et al. 1983).
Interpretation bias was measured with the Interpretation
Bias Task (IBT). This task was construed in line with the
threatening interpretation bias scenarios from Mayer et al.
(2009) and from MacLeod and Cohen (1993). The present
task contained 15 short ambiguous scenarios that describe
ambiguous scenes with anxiety and depression relevant con-
tent; see Table 1 for some examples. Scenarios were directly
followed by the possibility to give a free response (BWhat’s
going through your mind?^) to activate one’s own first
Table 1 Examples of ambiguous scenarios in the interpretation bias
task
Scenario Pre-set responses
1. You are giving a presentation
and notice two persons laughing.
What is going through your mind?
They are having fun time
together.
They are laughing about me.
2. You are about to move to another
city. You are wondering how you
will like it there. What is going
through your mind?
I’m hesitant; maybe I will
not get used to this place.
It’s going to be fun; there
will be a lot to discover.
3. You wake up in the middle of the
night because of a loud noise.
What is going through your mind?
Probably it’s something
outside or at the neighbors.
Oh no, there’s an intruder!
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impression of the ambiguous scene. These primary open re-
sponses were not part of the analyses. After that, two pre-set
responses (i.e., a negative interpretation and a neutral/slightly
positive interpretation) were presented, in counter-balanced
order. Participants had to indicate the degree of credibility of
each of the two pre-set responses on 100 mmVAS-scales (0 =
not credible at all, 100 = highly credible). A bias index was
calculated by subtracting the neutral/positive VAS score from
the negative VAS score and subsequently computing the av-
erage difference, creating a possible score range of − 100 to
100 with larger positive scores meaning a more negative in-
terpretation of the ambiguous situations (cf. a negative inter-
pretation bias).
Data Analyses
Data were inspected for normality, linearity, homoscedasticity,
and influential cases. Influentiality was assessed with the
Cook’s distance greater than 1 criterion (e.g., Field 2013),
where none of the cases exceeded the threshold (i.e., max =
.17). To test the hypotheses that interpretation bias mediates
the negative relationship between dispositional mindfulness
and symptoms of depression and anxiety, hierarchical regres-
sion analyses were conducted. In separate analyses, we com-
puted a total effect (c), direct effect (c′), and bootstrapped bias-
corrected 95% confidence intervals of the indirect effect (ab)
using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes 2012).
Confidence intervals that do not include zero indicate a sig-
nificant indirect effect (i.e., mediation).
Results
General descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 2. As can
be seen, all scales appear to have sufficient to good reliability
(.75 <α‘s < .94). Furthermore, as expected, the BDI depression
scale correlated highly with the STAI trait anxiety scale [r =
.79, p < .001]. Age was not correlated with these questionnaires
[all r’s < .13, p’s > .14; except for the interpretation bias task:
r = −.20, p < .05]. There were also no significant sex differ-
ences [t(131)‘s < 1.50, p’s > .13] other than for the FFMQ
mindfulness score [t(131) = 2.38, p < .05], with a higher mean
for men (M = 82.61, SD = 8.69) than for women (M = 77.43,
SD = 8.58). Also experience to meditation practices was not
different for both sexes [t(18.96) = 0.26, p > .05] and not related
to age or any of the questionnaires [all r’s < .13, p’s > .14].
In the first mediation model, it was examined whether inter-
pretation bias acted as a mediator in the negative relationship
between dispositional mindfulness and symptoms of depres-
sion. Outcomes of the analysis in terms of both standardized
and unstandardized coefficients are displayed in Fig. 1 and
Table 3, respectively. Together, dispositional mindfulness and
interpretation bias accounted for 39% of the variance in depres-
sion symptoms [F(2, 130) = 40.83, p < .001]. There was a sig-
nificant indirect effect (i.e., mediation) of mindfulness disposi-
tion on depression symptoms through interpretation bias [a*b:
B = − 0.10, SE = 0.05, 95% BCa CI: − 0.21, − 0.01]. The anal-
ysis further indicated that there was a significant total effect of
elevated mindfulness disposition inversely predicting level of
depression symptoms [c: B = −0.51, SE = 0.06, p < .001].
Dispositional mindfulness was also a significant negative pre-
dictor of interpretation bias [a: B = − 1.47, SE = 0.20, p < .001],
while interpretation bias significantly predicted level of depres-
sion symptoms [b: B = 0.07, SE = 0.03, p < .01]. Finally, when
both mindfulness disposition and interpretation bias were in-
cluded in the mediation model, the direct effect of mindfulness
disposition on depression symptoms decreased, but remained
significant [c’: B = −0.40, SE = 0.07, p < .001].
The second mediation model we tested involved examining
the mediation of interpretation bias in the relation between
dispositional mindfulness and trait anxiety levels. Outcomes
of this analysis are displayed in Fig. 2 and Table 3.
Dispositional mindfulness and interpretation bias were found
to account for 55% of the variance in levels of trait anxiety
[F(2, 130) = 78.72, p < .001]. There was a significant indirect
effect (i.e., mediation) of dispositional mindfulness on trait
anxiety through interpretation bias [a*b: B = −0.22, SE =
0.05, 95% BCa CI: −0.32, −0.13]. The analysis further indi-
cated a significant total effect of mindfulness disposition
predicting level of trait anxiety [c: B = −0.85, SE = 0.08,
p < .001]. Furthermore, dispositional mindfulness was a signif-
icant predictor of interpretation bias [a: B = −1.47, SE = 0.20,
p < .001], while interpretation bias was a significant predictor
of level of trait anxiety [b: B = 0.15, SE = 0.03, p < .001].
Table 2 General descriptive
statistics of questionnaire data N = 133 α M SD Observed range (Possible range)
FFMQ-SF .75 78.13 8.75 55–106 (24–120)
BDI-II .87 9.06 7.47 0–33 (0–63)
STAI-trait .94 42.52 10.90 23–73 (20–80)
IBT .78 − 22.66 23.90 − 83.47 to 71.73 (− 100 to 100)
Note: FFMQ-SF = Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire–short form; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory;
STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; IBT = Interpretation Bias Task
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Finally, when both mindfulness disposition and interpretation
bias were included in the mediation model, the direct effect of
mindfulness disposition on trait anxiety decreased, but
remained significant [c’: B = −0.63, SE = 0.09, p < .001].
Additional Analyses
Since the psychometric support for the FFMQ-SF as a unidi-
mensional measure of mindfulness is somewhat ambivalent
(see Bohlmeijer et al. 2011), we conducted additional correla-
tional analyses for the FFMQ-subscales and the other vari-
ables in both models of Study 1. Firstly, we found that all
FFMQ-subscales correlated significantly with the FFMQ-
total score, with r ranging from .28 for the Observe-subscale
to .66 for the Nonreact-subscale. However, in contrast to the
other subscales, which were all significantly inter-related, the
Observe-subscale correlated significantly with only one of the
other subscales (i.e., Nonreact, r = .22, p < .01). Furthermore,
the Observe-subscale was not significantly correlated with
either one of the dependent variables or the mediator. In con-
trast, the remaining subscales all correlated significantly
(p < .001) with trait anxiety, depression symptoms, and inter-
pretation bias, with r ranging from −.30 to −.68. Finally, we
conducted re-analyses of the mediation models with either
symptoms of anxiety or depression as the outcome, interpre-
tation bias as the mediator and, in separate analyses, each of
the FFMQ-subscales as the predictor. In all cases, the separate
FFMQ-subscales showed significant indirect effects, with the
exception of the Observe-subscale. Thus, the mediation of
interpretation bias in the relation between dispositional mind-
fulness and either levels of anxiety or depressive symptoms,
also exists for the separate subscales of the FFMQ, with the
exception of the Observe-subscale.
Study 2
As stated before, in the second study we examined the general-
izability of the Study 1 findings by including acceptance as an
important mindfulness-related predictor in the hypothesized
model, and by testing a community convenience sample with
relatively broad ranges of age and educational level. It was
hypothesized that cognitive interpretation bias acts as amediator
in the specific relation between acceptance, on the one hand, and
depression and anxiety symptomatology, on the other hand.
Method
Participants
Participants were approached via social media (i.e.,
Facebook), flyers, and e-mail. Participants (N = 186) were
a: β = -.54***       b: β = .23** 
c’: β = -.47*** 
a*b: β = -.12 [95% CI: -.24, -.02] 
Mindfulness
disposion
Depression
symptoms
Interpretaon bias
Fig. 1 Model displaying standardized effects (β) between dispositional
mindfulness (FFMQ-SF), interpretation bias (IBT) and depression
symptoms (BDI-II). Note: The confidence interval for the indirect effect
is a BCa bootstrapped CI based on 1000 samples. **p < .01, ***p < .001
Table 3 Model estimates
(unstandardized coef, B) for
mediation models in study 1
Direct effects Indirect effects
R2 Path Coef SE p Coeff a*b SE 95% CI
FFMQ-SF-> IBT->BDI-II .39*** a − 1.47 0.20 <.001 − 0.10 0.05 − 0.21, − 0.01
b 0.07 0.03 <.01
c − 0.51 0.06 <.001
c’ − 0.40 0.07 <.001
FFMQ-SF->IBT->STAI .55*** a − 1.47 0.20 <.001 − 0.22 0.05 − 0.32, − 0.13
b 0.15 0.03 <.001
c − 0.85 0.08 <.001
c’ − 0.63 0.09 <.001
Note. FFMQ-SF = Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire – short form; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory;
STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; IBT = Interpretation Bias Task; The confidence interval for the indirect
effect is a BCa bootstrapped CI based on 1000 samples; ***p < .001
a: β = -.54***       b: β = .33*** 
c’: β = -.51*** 
a*b: β = -.18 [95% CI: -.28, -.11] 
Mindfulness
disposion
Trait anxiety
Interpretaon bias
Fig. 2 Model displaying standardized effects (β) between dispositional
mindfulness (FFMQ-SF), interpretation bias (IBT) and trait anxiety
(STAI). Note: The confidence interval for the indirect effect is a BCa
bootstrapped CI based on 1000 samples. ***p < .001
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122 women (65.6%) and 64 men (34.4%) with a mean age of
36.48 years (SD = 14.34, range 18–76). Highest accomplished
education in this sample was as follows: 0.5% primary school,
31.7% secondary school (medium level), 7.5% secondary
school (high level), 31.7% higher professional education,
16.7% academic level, and 3.2% different from the aforemen-
tioned. By far the largest part had a traditional Dutch back-
ground (96.2%), with some participants having other origins,
like Surinam (2.2%), Turkish (0.5%), or other (1.1%). The
majority of this group (56.5%) did not have any meditation
experience, whereas 28% had a bit and 15.5% had (quite)
some experience with meditation practices.
Procedure
Similar to the procedure in Study 1, data were collected
through a web-based survey using the online survey software
Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT, USA). Participants were in-
vited to take part in the study using social media and flyers.
Interested persons could respond to research assistants and
consequently received an e-mail with short introduction and
link to the online questionnaire. Participants were instructed to
fill out the questionnaire in one consecutive session without
significant sensory disturbances. The questionnaire started
with explanation of ethical rules (like anonymous data collec-
tion and complete voluntary participation), followed by re-
spectively the AAQ-II, IBT, BDI-II, STAI-trait, and some
general questions on demographics, treatment history, and
meditation experience. Subjects did not receive credits for
participation.
Measures
Similar assessment instruments were used to assess symptoms
of depression (BDI-II; Beck et al. 1996; Van der Does 2002),
trait anxiety (STAI; Spielberger et al. 1983; Van der Van der
Ploeg et al. 1980), and interpretation bias (IBT) as in Study 1.
With the Dutch version of the Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Bond et al. 2011; Jacobs et al.
2008), acceptance, as the reverse of experiential avoidance,
was measured. The AAQ-II is the default measure of
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), which is one
of the important mindfulness-based third generation cognitive
behavior therapies. The AAQ-II was developed from an item
pool generated by ACT researchers and therapists (Bond et al.
2011) and is the current form for measuring acceptance (cf.
Fledderus et al. 2012). Participants had to rate to what extend
they agreed with each of 10 items on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (not at all/never true) to 7 (very/always true). A sample
item is BI am afraid of my feelings^. After recoding, higher
scores indicate higher levels of acceptance. Psychometric
qualities are good (Bond et al. 2011).
Data Analyses
Similar techniques of data inspection and analyses as per-
formed in Study 1, were carried out.
Results
General questionnaire statistics are summarized in Table 4. As
can be seen, all scales appear to have good reliability (all
α‘s > .78). Furthermore, as indicated by a negative mean in-
terpretation bias score (IBT), participants showed overall a
healthy bias favoring benign interpretations to the ambiguous
scenarios. As expected, the symptomatology scales BDI-II
and STAI were highly correlated [r = .81, p < .001].
Significant gender differences were found only for BDI-II-
scores [t(176.08) = 1.98, p < .05], with higher levels of depres-
sion symptoms for women (M = 7.17; SD = 6.38) than for men
(M = 5.64; SD = 4.12). Age was not significantly related to
any of these scales [all r‘s < |.06|; all p‘s > .47]. In other words,
with regard to acceptance and interpretation bias no differences
for gender or relations with age were found. Meditation expe-
rience was found to be positively related with age [r = .19,
p = .01] but not with any of the other questionnaire measures.
Also no gender differences were found with regard to experi-
ence with meditation practice: t(184) = 1.66, p > .05.
Outcomes of the analysis examining the mediation of ac-
ceptance and depression symptoms through reduction in in-
terpretation bias reporting both standardized and unstandard-
ized coefficients, are displayed in Fig. 3 and Table 5, respec-
tively. Together, acceptance and interpretation bias accounted
for 47% of the variance in depression symptoms [F(2,183) =
82.14, p < .001]. There was a significant indirect effect (i.e.,
mediation) of acceptance on depression symptoms through
interpretation bias [a*b: B = −0.06, SE = 0.03, 95% BCa CI:
−0.13, −0.01]. The analysis further indicated that there was a
significant total effect of elevated acceptance levels inversely
predicting depression symptoms [c: B = −0.45, SE = .04,
p < .001]. Furthermore, acceptance was a significant predictor
of reduced interpretation bias [a: B = −1.58, SE = 0.16,
p < .001], while interpretation bias was a significant predictor
Table 4 General descriptive statistics of questionnaire data
N = 186 α M SD Observed range (Possible range)
AAQ-II .85 52.51 8.57 29–70 (10–70)
BDI-II .83 6.65 5.74 0–31 (0–63)
STAI-trait .94 35.74 10.59 20–69 (20–80)
IBT .78 − 39.93 23.12 − 95.20 to 26.93 (− 100 to 100)
Note: AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; BDI-II = Beck
Depression Inventory; STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; IBT =
Interpretation Bias Task
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of increased levels of depression [b: B = 0.04, SE = 0.02,
p < .05]. Finally, when both acceptance and interpretation bias
were included in the mediation model, the direct effect of
acceptance on depression symptoms decreased, but remained
significant [c’: B = −0.39, SE = 0.04, p < .001].
Analyses also supported the second mediation model
where we examined whether interpretation bias mediated the
association between acceptance and trait anxiety level; see
Fig. 4 and Table 5. Together, acceptance and interpretation
bias accounted for 66% of the variance in trait anxiety
[F(2,183) = 174.33, p < .001]. There was a significant indirect
effect (i.e., mediation) of acceptance on trait anxiety through
interpretation bias [a*b: B = −0.13, SE = 0.04, 95%CI: − 0.22,
− 0.04]. The analysis further indicated that there was a signif-
icant total effect of elevated acceptance levels inversely
predicting trait anxiety level [c: B = −0.99, SE = 0.05,
p < .001]. As indicated before, acceptance was a significant
predictor of reduced levels of interpretation bias [a: B =
−1.58, SE = 0.16, p < .001], while interpretation bias was
found to significantly predict levels of trait anxiety [b: B =
0.08, SE = 0.02, p < .01]. Finally, when both acceptance and
interpretation bias were included in the mediation model, the
direct effect of acceptance on trait anxiety decreased, but
remained significant [c’: B = −0.86, SE = 0.07, p < .001].
Discussion
In these current studies, an attempt was made to investigate
the theorized relation between mindfulness and cognitive in-
terpretation bias as a possible mechanism of change in the
relation between mindfulness skills and lower levels of anxi-
ety and depressive symptomatology. As mindfulness is theo-
retically suggested to go along with, or is even defined by,
unbiased processing and a beginner’s mind (e.g., Bishop
et al. 2004), paying attention to what is actually happening
without trying to alter or change (cf. acceptance) (Brown and
Ryan 2004), no filtering through one’s cognitive apparatus
(Lakey et al. 2008) and veridical appraisals instead of evalu-
ations by expectations and beliefs (Vago 2014), one would
expect more mindfully skilled individuals to demonstrate less
cognitive interpretation bias when being confronted with am-
biguous situations. This association was examined in the pres-
ent studies by looking at levels of dispositional mindfulness
(measured with the FFMQ-sf; Bohlmeijer et al. 2011) and
levels of acceptance (measured with the AAQ-II; Bond et al.
2011) as an important element of mindfulness, in respectively
a sample of undergraduate students and a community conve-
nience sample in relation to their interpretation bias.
Moreover, it was studied whether interpretation bias served
 a: β = -.59***       b: β = .16* 
c’: β = -.58*** 
a*b: β = -.09 [95% CI: -.20, -.03] 
Acceptance Depression
symptoms
Interpretaon bias
Fig. 3 Model displaying standardized effects (β) between acceptance
(AAQ-II), interpretation bias (IBT) and depression symptoms (BDI-II).
Note: The confidence interval for the indirect effect is a BCa bootstrapped
CI based on 1000 samples. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Table 5 Model estimates
(unstandardized coef, B) for
mediation models in study 2
Direct effects Indirect effects
R2 Path Coef SE p Coef a*b SE 95% CI
AAQ-II->IBT->BDI-II .47*** a − 1.58 0.16 <.001 − 0.06 0.03 − 0.13, − 0.01
b 0.04 0.02 <.05
c − 0.45 0.04 <.001
c’ − 0.39 0.04 <.001
AAQ-II->IBT->STAI .66*** a − 1.58 0.16 <.001 − 0.13 0.04 − 0.22, − 0.04
b 0.08 0.02 <.01
c − 0.99 0.05 <.001
c’ − 0.86 0.07 <.001
Note. AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory; STAI = State Trait
Anxiety Inventory; IBT = Interpretation Bias Task; The confidence interval for the indirect effect is a BCa
bootstrapped CI based on 1000 samples; ***p < .001
a: β = -.59***       b: β = .17** 
c’: β = -.70*** 
a*b: β = -.10 [95% CI: -.18, -.04] 
Acceptance Trait anxiety
Interpretaon bias
Fig. 4 Model displaying standardized effects (β) between acceptance
(AAQ-II), interpretation bias (IBT) and trait anxiety (STAI). Note: The
confidence interval for the indirect effect is a BCa bootstrapped CI based
on 1000 samples. **p < .01, ***p < .001
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as a mediator in the relation between these mindfulness skills,
on the one hand, and levels of depression and anxiety, on the
other hand, as this would shed somemore light on the working
mechanisms of mindfulness-based protocols as effective treat-
ments of depression and anxiety problems.
To begin with, results of the present studies support the idea
that there are clear relations between dispositional mindful-
ness and acceptance, and levels of depression and anxiety. In
other words, individuals with more (intensive) moments of
mindfulness practice during daily life demonstrate less depres-
sion and anxiety symptomatology. This is perfectly in line
with the third CBT-generation treatment studies showing the
effects of mindfulness and acceptance training on several
forms of internalizing and externalizing psychopathology
(e.g., Hilton et al. 2016; Hofmann et al. 2010; Li et al. 2017).
More interestingly however, results further showed that
there is indeed a relation between these mindfulness skills,
and cognitive interpretation bias. That is, both in a student
sample and a community sample, higher levels of, respective-
ly, dispositional mindfulness and acceptance were found to be
substantially related to a smaller amount of negative interpre-
tations of ambiguous daily-life situations. Moreover, this in-
terpretation bias was found to serve as mediator in the relation
between dispositional mindfulness and acceptance, on the one
hand, and depression and anxiety symptomatology, on the
other hand. Naturally, our findings are cross-sectional and thus
conclusions of causality and directionality are not possible,
since the temporal order of the relations between variables
was not established. Consequently, an alternative
explanation of the current findings might be that less
interpretation bias is related to more dispositional
mindfulness and acceptance, which in turn is related to less
depression and anxiety. A strategy to investigate which model
is more likely that has appeared in the literature, is to compare
the size and/or significance of the indirect effect in alternative
variants of the model. However, several recent publications,
such as Thoemmes (2015) and Lemmer and Gollwitzer
(2017), showed that it is not possible to determine merely on
a statistical basis which of the different models we could de-
fine within the same set of three variables (a so-called equiv-
alence class) is the most plausible. Therefore, further research
is warranted to investigate causal directionality. For instance,
in an experimental design the direct effect of both mindfulness
skills and cognitive interpretation bias on depression and anx-
iety and on the possible mediators could be compared between
groups by using targeted interventions, such as mindfulness-
based stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn 1990) and cognitive bias
modification (see Hallion and Ruscio 2011; Mathews and
Mackintosh 2000).
Nevertheless, we believe that this study makes an impor-
tant contribution to the understanding of possible mechanisms
of the functioning of mindfulness and acceptance on depres-
sion and anxiety. The current findings could explain the
observed therapeutic effects of mindfulness-based treatments
for depression and anxiety problems as being partially obtain-
ed by a reduction of interpretation bias. This of course fits
nicely with the cognitive models of psychopathology (Beck
1976) and with the mechanism of change approach of cogni-
tive biasmodification (CBM-I; e.g., Mathews andMackintosh
2000). With this CBM-technique, participants are trained
away from their biased negative interpretation of ambiguity
to adopt a more neutral or positive interpretation. Results of
these particular studies indeed showed that reducing interpre-
tation bias resulted in reduced anxiety symptoms (Beard and
Amir 2008) and depression levels (Blackwell and Holmes
2010; Lang et al. 2012). Since in CBM-techniques the aim
is changing the content of thoughts while in mindfulness-
based treatments the key process is changing the attitude to
thoughts, it would be interesting to examine in future studies
the precise processes of these techniques in relation to inter-
pretation—and other cognitive-bias(es) more in depth and
whether they have different effects on generalizability and
long-term duration of the effects.
Limitations
In addition to the cross-sectional nature of the current studies,
some other limitations can be defined. First, we tested the
hypotheses in two non-clinical samples. Consequently, in both
studies the symptomatology measures (i.e., BDI-II and STAI-
trait) are on the lower end of the scale and the dispositional
mindfulness and acceptance measures (i.e., FFMQ and AAQ-
II, respectively) are on the higher end of the scale. Thus, par-
ticipants were relatively low on psychopathology and relative-
ly high on dispositional mindfulness and acceptance.
Therefore, it should be noted that only a limited range of these
constructs have been tested. In addition to this, it is relevant to
acknowledge that in both studies the mean interpretation bias
scores indicated an overall healthy bias favoring benign inter-
pretations to the ambiguous scenarios. In other words, al-
though on a positive note it is worth mentioning that we found
in both the student sample and the convenience community
sample a comparable strength of significant relations between
all these relevant variables, it can of course not be ruled out
that these relations differ from those in individuals with clin-
ically high levels of anxiety or depression, an actual negative
interpretation bias, and/or considerable low levels of disposi-
tional mindfulness and acceptance. It would be worthwhile to
investigate this explicitly in future studies.
As a second additional limitation, in the first study we
examined the relations in a student population, with a conse-
quently relatively small range in (young) age and (high) edu-
cational level. Moreover, although not related to dispositional
mindfulness score, in this (Psychology) student sample a rel-
atively large proportion (i.e., 45.9%) of participants reported
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having at least a bit of experience with meditation practice.
These of course affect the generalizability of the results to the
general population. Note, however, that in the second study, a
more general public was examined in our community sample.
Further, all measures were self-report measures, which makes
it susceptible to socially desirable answers or poor introspec-
tive capacity. Another limitation of self-report measures is of
course common method variance, which may have exagger-
ated the size of the relational effects. Finally, we measured
mindfulness and acceptance as a dispositional trait while it
could be argued that mindfulness is typically seen as a state.
Although mindfulness is indeed usually defined as a state (or
mode; Bishop et al. 2004), one could identify people who are
more experienced or skilled to practice states of mindfulness
and acceptance, than others (cf. Brown and Ryan 2004).
Therefore, individuals in the general population (most of
whom have no formal meditation experience) differ reliably
in the propensity to be mindful and accepting.
The finding that dispositional mindfulness and acceptance
seem to be related to symptoms of depression and anxiety via
a reduced cognitive interpretation bias gives usmore insight in
the possible mechanisms of change of mindfulness-based
treatments in the context of depression and anxiety problems.
A strong point of the current studies was that the effect of
mindfulness was demonstrated in different samples and mea-
suring different features of mindfulness practice. That is, both
dispositional mindfulness and the mindfulness-related con-
struct of acceptancewere found to partially relate to symptoms
of depression and anxiety via reduced interpretation bias.
Furthermore, this pertinent mediation relation was obtained
in a student sample as well as in a community sample with a
broader range of age and educational level.
In future studies, it might be interesting to combine mind-
fulness disposition, as measured with the FFMQ, and accep-
tance, as measured with the AAQ-II, together as predictors in
the relation with cognitive bias and levels of depression and
anxiety, as this would give information how exactly these
mindfulness concepts are related in the particular context of
information processing biases and psychopathological symp-
toms. Furthermore, future studies might examine causality of
the observed mediation relation by using an experimental set-
up where state mindfulness or acceptance is manipulated and
negative interpretation bias and internalizing symptoms are
measured.
To conclude, our findings indicate that individual differ-
ences in mindfulness and interpretation bias relate to individ-
ual differences in both symptoms of depression and anxiety.
Specifically, the larger the dispositional mindfulness and ac-
ceptance and the smaller the cognitive interpretation bias, the
lower the levels of depression and anxiety symptoms tended
to be. More interestingly, we found that the negative relation
between these mindfulness skills and psychopathological
symptoms was indirect, accounted for by their shared relation
with interpretation bias. In other words, interpretation bias
served as a mediator between dispositional mindfulness and
acceptance, and symptoms of depression and anxiety. With
this finding, some more insight in the working mechanisms
of mindfulness-based treatments on internalizing psychopa-
thology has been obtained.
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